Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2007

State of Utah v. Brenda Christine White : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Mark L. Shurtleff; Kris C. Leonard;Office of Utah Attorney General; Attorneys for Appellee.
Jason A. Schatz; Attorney for Appellant; Schatz, Anderson and Uday, LLC.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. White, No. 20071008 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2007).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/616

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee.
vs.
BRENDA CHRISTINE WHITE,
Defendant/Appellant.

]
)>
[
)
]
[
)

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
[INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL]

Case No. 20071008-CA

Appeal from an interlocutory order of the trial court denying Brenda
Christine White's motion in limine to allow the jury to hear evidence in support
of the defense of Extreme Emotional Distress at her trial as decided by the
Honorable William W. Barrett, Third Judicial District Court Judge in and for Salt
Lake County, State of Utah. Permission to Appeal the interlocutory order was
granted by this Court following transfer from the Utah Supreme Court.
JASON A. SCHATZ, # 9969
Attorney for Appellant
Schatz, Anderson & Uday, LLC
57 West 200 South, #200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
MARK L. SHURTLEFF, # 4666
KRIS C. LEONARD, # 4902
Attorneys for Appellee
Office of the Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854

FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

APR 3 0.2008

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH ,
Plaintiff/Appellee.
vs.
BRENDA CHRISTINE WHITE,

]
1
(
)
;
(

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
[INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL]

Case No. 20071008-CA

Defendant/Appellant.

Appeal from an interlocutory order of the trial court denying Brenda
Christine White's motion in limine to allow the jury to hear evidence in support
of the defense of Extreme Emotional Distress at her trial as decided by the
Honorable William W. Barrett, Third Judicial District Court Judge in and for Salt
Lake County, State of Utah. Permission to Appeal the interlocutory order was
granted by this Court following transfer from the Utah Supreme Court.
JASON A. SCHATZ, # 9969
Attorney for Appellant
Schatz, Anderson & Uday, LLC
57 West 200 South, # 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
MARK L. SHURTLEFF, # 4666
KRIS C. LEONARD, # 4902
Attorneys for Appellee
Office of the Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iii

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

iv

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

iv

STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

v

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

2

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

11

ARGUMENT

12

I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING MS. WHITE'S MOTION IN
LIMINE TO INTRODUCE THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF
EXTREME EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
12
A. Ms. White enjoys the right to present her defense to the jury

13

B. Ms White's circumstances, a subjective view, were erroneously omitted
from the trial court's analysis
15
C. The trial court erred when it required a contemporaneous highly
provocative triggering event

19

D. Cumulative effects from stressors permissibly justify the defense of
extreme emotional distress
22
E. Additional considerations support that Ms. White is entitled to the
defense of extreme emotional distress
23
CONCLUSION

25

ADDENDA:
Addendum A: Trial Court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
Addendum B: Court of Appeals Order Granting Petition for Permission to Appeal
Interlocutory Order.
ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
People v. Casassa, 404 N.E.2d 1310 (N.Y. 1980)
People v. Liebman, 583 N.Y.S.2d 234 (N.Y.A.D. 1 Dept. 1992)
People v. Patterson, 347 N.E.2d 898 (N.Y. 1976)

17,23
17
22,23

State v. Bishop. 753 P.2d 439 (Utah 1988)

16, 17,18, 19

State v. Brown. 607 P.2d 261 (Utah 1980)

13, 14

State v. Castillo, 457 P.2d 618 (Utah 1960)

14

State v. Cloud. 722 P.3d 750 (Utah 1986)

15

State v. Crick. 675 P.2d 527 (Utah 1983)

24

State v.Elliott, 177 Conn. 1, 411 A.2d 3 (1979)
State v. Lopez, 789 P.2d 39 (Utah App. 1990)
State v. Shumwav, 2002 UT 124, 63 P.3d 94

23, 24
14
14,15,17,19, 20, 21

State v. Spillers Til, 2005 UT App. 283, 116 P.3d 985, aff d 152 P.3d 315 (UT 2007) ...20
State v. Spillers rill, 2007 UT 13, 152P.3d315

21,23,24,25

State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254 (Utah 1998)

15

State v. Trieb, 315 N.W.2d 649 (N.D. 1982)

23

Statutes, Rules and Constitutional Provisions
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution

.passim

Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(4)

passim

Rule 5, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure

2

iii

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND
STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. Whether the trial court erred in denying Defendant's motion in limine to
introduce the aliinnative dclcnsc ol Klreini1 Hnodnnal llislrcss for which ihnv r a
rnisi tiiable r> nisi4 or o\plnnn1ioii IT inline that Defendant did not meet the standard
required for the defense as the proffers relied on were either too remote in time or
insufficient to justily the delensc at dial
Tlie rinding oil nt ruin In i n ot 1 n,T ind Order for this issue is attached at
Addendum A.
Standard of Review:
Trial ronrl i nm In n n ol \w aiv rn'im nl hv 1 Ifah appellate courts under a
correction of error standard granting no deference to the trial court for its legal

conclusions. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994); State v. Wanosik, 2001 UT App
241,31P.3d615.

STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Amendment IV, Constitution of the United States
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violstted, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Amendment XIV, Constitution of the United States (in pertinent part)
Section. 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(4) (in pertinent part): [Extreme Emotional Distress]
(4)(a) It is an affirmative defense to a charge of murder or attempted murder that
the defendant caused the death of another or attempted to cause the death of
another:
(i) under the influence of extreme emotional distress for which there is a reasonable
explanation or excuse;
(b) Under Subsection (4)(a)(i) emotional distress does not include:
(i) a condition resulting from mental illness as defined in Section 76-2- 305; or
(ii) distress that is substantially caused by the defendant's own conduct.
(c) The reasonableness of an explanation or excuse under Subsection (4)(a)(i) or
the reasonable belief of the actor under Subsection (4)(a)(ii) shall be determined
from the viewpoint of a reasonable person under the then existing circumstances.
(d) This affirmative defense reduces charges only as follows:
(i) murder to manslaughter; and
(ii) attempted murder to attempted manslaughter.
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH ,

]

Plaintiff/Appellee.

]•
[

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
[INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL]

vs.
BRENDA CHRISTINE WHITE,

;
[

Case No. 20071008-CA

Defendant/Appellant.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an interlocutory appeal from a pretrial motion denied by the trial
court in a case alleging Ms. White committed the crimes of Attempted Criminal
Homicide, a first degree felony, and Criminal Mischief, a second degree felony.
The interlocutory order appealed herein is the denial of a motion in limine to
permit the introduction of the affirmative defense of extreme emotional distress1 at
the jury trial in her defense. The Honorable William W. Barrett, Judge, Third
Judicial District Court, entered a denial of that request on December 10, 2007.

1

This defense is codified within the Homicide statute itself at Utah Code Ann. §
76-5-203(4). See page v, supra; also reproduced in part, infra, p. 15-16. The
extreme emotional distress defense is more accurately and completely stated as
"extreme emotional distress for which there is a reasonable explanation or
excuse." Ms. White will refer to the defense intending its full verbiage with the
shorthand of "extreme emotional distress."

1

Pursuant to Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Ms. White
petitioned the Utah Supreme Court to permit an appeal from this interlocutory
order (as well as one other related motion and denial) of the trial court. The
Supreme Court transferred the petition to this Court, R. 697, who on January 31,
2008, granted the petition for permission to appeal this interlocutory order raised
herein. See Addendum B for of copy of this Court's order granting the petition on
the denial of the motion in limine issue only. A copy of the trial court's findings
of facts and conclusions of law and order are attached in the addenda at
Addendum A.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Brenda Christine White was charged by Amended Information with two
counts of criminal conduct: Attempted Murder, a First Degree Felony, and
Criminal Mischief, a second degree felony. The charges stemmed from a single
event occurring the 26th day of April, 2006, at 4021 South 700 East, a building
complex known as the Woodlands Tower II, in Salt Lake County. R. 1-3.
On April 26, 2006, Brenda White arrived at the Woodland Towers office
building to meet with her ex-husband Jon White to acquire his participation in
refinancing the home mortgage as he had previously and repeatedly promised. Jon
White told her to return later to talk. R. 711 at 31-33.

2

The couple had been married for eleven years; two children were born
during the marriage. R. 711 at 28, 65-67. Jon White moved out of the home prior
to Thanksgiving in November of 2005. Id. As a result of a mediation agreement,
Jon White had promised to assist in refinancing the two mortgages, giving up his
equity in the house to Ms. White in lieu of making any payments of alimony or
paying any bills, including any portion of either of the mortgages. R 711 at 32.
Mr. White, however, then refused to cooperate with the refinance leaving her in
financial disaster. She returned and they talked about the refinancing; he refused
to assist with the refinancing as he had promised. Instead he utilized his leverage
on her need for the refinance to pressure her to sign divorce papers. R.711 at 36.
He returned to work and she left the area. R 711 at 34, 40.
Ms. White returned later that day, around 4:30 p.m., to again beseech her
ex-husband for the assistance he had promised. R. 446, 448. She observed him
exiting the office complex talking on a cell phone, a cell phone that he had
repeatedly told her he did not own. R. 711 at 75. Ms. White had tried for months
to obtain cell phone information from Jon White to facilitate communications with
his children and to arrange visiting schedules for the two children. Jon White had
repeatedly responded that he did not posses a cell phone. R. 448-49; 711 at 75.
The State's probable cause statement from the Information describes the
next events as follows:
The defendant drove over the raised curb of the parking structure
[where Jon White was leaving work] and chased Mr. White through the
parking lot as he ran toward the Woodland Towers. Mr. White entered the
3

east side of the building through a double set of glass doors. Mr. White
continued to run through the building to a lobby on the west side. The
defendant drove her vehicle through the glass doors and down a hallway to
the lobby. The defendant struck Mr. White with the explorer, causing Mr.
White to flip over the vehicle and fall to the ground. The defendant drove
through the lobby windows and stopped her vehicle. The defendant put
her vehicle in reverse and backed into the lobby. Mr. White stood up and
fled down a side hallway. The defendant turned her car around in the
lobby and stopped the vehicle.
Mr. White received several cuts and abrasion to his hands, legs,
arms and face. Mr. White's ankle was dislocated.
R. 2-3. A more detailed version of the facts of those events is contained in the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order prepared by the prosecution
and found in Addendum A. That rendition of the facts includes a recitation of Jon
White's testimony from the preliminary hearing which indicates that after he had
again refused to cooperate and assist in the refinance, Ms. White played a song on
her car radio which contained the lyrics, "I want to kill you. I want to blow you
away." Ms. White joined her fingers together, mimicked as a gun; and as the
music played told him that when her father took her shooting, she thought about
shooting him. Jon White testified that this action was repeated numerous times.
He also testified that she also referred to him as a parasite and that she was going
to wipe him off the earth. Id.; R. 711 at 35-38.
A preliminary hearing on the matter was held December 1, 2006. During
the preliminary hearing the prosecutor inquired how long prior to the divorce had
he contemplated thoughts or discussions of divorce. R. 711 at 60-65. Jon White
testified that over five years it progressively had gotten worse. He also indicated
he had moved out earlier in 2004 for a period of time. During cross-examination
4

of Jon White, the defense attempted to inquire into specifics about the
deterioration of the marriage, manipulation of Ms. White, the divorce and other
related issues. R. 711 at 60-64. The court initially permitted that questioning over
the objection of the State. However, when the defense began to explore questions
regarding sexual relations, the State objected again. R. 711 at 70-72. The defense
insisted that not only had the State opened the door, but also indicated its intent to
present and develop the affirmative defense of extreme emotional distress2 through
such questioning. The court ruled that the defense could question Mr. White about
anything he may have done to try to provoke his ex-wife but sustained the
objection about sexual relations. Id., R. 711 at 74-76.
The State sought a clarification of the magistrate's use of the term
"provocation" attempting to limit the inquiry to only events of the day of the
alleged crimes. R. 711 at 71. An in-chambers discussion occurred where the
defense proffered the testimony of certain actions and events which the exhusband employed over the more recent period of the marriage to manipulate and
distress Ms. White. R. 711 at 74-82. This testimony included Jon White's
treatment of Ms. White through the marriage, including a rather recent period of
Jon White's marital infidelity, an extra-marital affair with a co-worker. R. 711 at

2

Once again, this defense is codified within the Homicide statute itself at Utah
Code Ann. § 76-5-203(4). The statute is contained in pertinent part, infra, at p. 1516, and in fuller text, supra at v. The extreme emotional distress defense is more
accurately and completely stated as "extreme emotional distress for which there is
a reasonable explanation or excuse." Ms. White will refer to the defense intending
its full verbiage with the shorthand of "extreme emotional distress."
5

75-76. The defense also proffered an instance later in the marriage documented by
a police investigation and report of the possession and use/abuse of child
pornography by Jon White. R. 711 at 73-75. Additionally, the defense introduced
a proffer describing a sexual tryst the ex-husband had arranged where he
orchestrated a "threesome" with yet another co-worker and Ms. White. R. 711 at
74-80.
Other problems existed in the marriage and more specifically the
dissolution of the marriage and were proffered to the district court in support of
the motion in limine. R. 714. Ms. White and the children were not receiving any
financial support from Jon White from the time he left at Thanksgiving of 2005
and she was forced to make a mediation agreement in January to settle the divorce
on the promise of getting some money to support the family. Poor legal advice
assured her that giving up monthly income via alimony, house and bill payments
was a fair trade for his half of the equity in the home. R. 443-50. There were no
temporary orders obtained by her lawyer to provide for interim payments and the
settlement agreement signed in January provided none, except for child support
beginning in March. Id.
Ms. White was on medications for anxiety, depression and sleep. R. 444.
During this time Jon White was to provide health coverage for the family but on
two separate occasions he cancelled the coverage causing a lapse in her ability to
acquire the medication which resulted in an increase in her anger, her depression
and all that went with it. Ms. White, on one occasion, was required to go to Jon
6

White's workplace herself to have the insurance benefits reinstated. In the
meantime she was without her medications. She had no money to pay for them.
Moreover, she deteriorated in her mental state and ability to deal with all that was
going on around her. Id.
She was a single mother of two children working a $ 12.50 cent an hour
job, at a telephone call center, with new financial obligations of approximately $
1,400.00 per month on a first and second mortgage, plus credit card debt resulting
from the marriage of another $ 200.00 to $ 300.00 per month and all the other
family expenses. R. 433, 443-450.
Ms. White had to increase her work from part-time to Ml time; and in fact,
began to work overtime—often working up to as much as 60-70 hours a week to
try and make ends meet. Id. Ms. White saw less of her children than before which
resulted in additional stressors from the children. And at the same time, Jon White
began to withdraw from participating with the children. R. 446. Jon White would
make the visits difficult for Ms. White, for example he would insist on an 8 o'
clock pickup of the children on times when he knew Ms. White was in a group
counseling class that did not terminate until 8 p.m. Id. He would require that Ms.
White leave the counseling sessions early to pick up the children at 8 p.m., rather
than waiting until 8:15 p.m., or he would require her to arrange for someone else
to do so.
As money became more difficult her ability to pay for medications
decreased and her doctor assisted by providing sample packets of the medications
7

whenever she could. However, that doctor died in early April leaving her without
a treatment doctor and without appropriate medication. R. 446-47; 711 at 79.
The mediation agreement, determined in January, to eventually become the
divorce settlement, still left her without finances. The unfortunate settlement
provided that Ms. White would receive the equity in the home, but would be
required to pay from that equity an approximated additional $ 10,000.00 of debt
accumulated during the marriage. Of course, she had to pay these bills in the
interim, while waiting for the settlement date to arrive. R. 447.
While the settlement agreement would provide Ms. White with child
support of approximately $ 650.00 per month, no relief was in sight. R. 447. She
fell behind in house and bill payments despite working so much overtime. As part
of the settlement agreement urged on her by her counsel, Jon White insisted that
he not participate in paying the house payments and that he surrender his half of
the equity in trade for no alimony and no payments. Id.
The unfortunate reality of the settlement was that the equity she now had in
the home was of no value unless she could get the money out and pay the living
expenses, mortgages and other bills. Id. If she could not refinance the mortgages
and get the equity out to live on she could even lose the house. Ms. White began
to see the potential of this reality after the settlement and her finances did not
improve. R. 447-48. She desired to refinance the home to free up that money to
live on and pay the bills as anticipated in the agreement. However, due to her
short work history, large debt and late payments, Ms. White could not get a loan to
8

refinance the home. Ms. White approached Jon White for the assistance with the
refinance that he had promised, and he vacillated and backed out of his agreement
to do so. R. 447-48; 711 at 33-35.
Ms. White could not obtain the refinancing without him. Id.
She finally contacted new counsel and discussed attempting to re-open the
divorce agreement as unworkable. R. 444, 448.
Jon White then agreed to assist with the refinance but then he would back
out again. R. 448.
The relationship between Jon White and the children became more
problematic. He spent less time with them, disappointed them more and was
unavailable for contact. Ms. White requested that he provide his cell phone
number to her so the kids could contact him directly, but he repeatedly told her
that he did not have one. R. 448-49. He was becoming less and less involved in
caring for and caring about his family. Id.
The day of the incident, April 26th, Ms. White went to Jon White's
workplace earlier in the day to speak with him and have him talk on the phone to
the mortgage broker. He refused to do so until later. When she went back the
second time, he spoke with the mortgage banker but he would not cooperate in the
refinance. R. 711 at 33-34.
Ms. White left his workplace but returned a second time to again speak
with him about the refinance of the mortgages and assisting in providing for his

9

children. Ms. White felt he had promised to assist her in releasing the equity from
the home. R. 448.
When Ms. White saw Jon White leave the workplace talking on a cell
phone, a cell phone that he denied owning for communication with the children.
Ms. White was overcome with all that has been described above. R. 449. Her
anger, agitation, loss, grief and the disappointment for her and the children
resulted in her inability to control herself. Those emotions controlled her actions.
R. 448-49.
These events and others including the fact that Ms. White was only recently
aware that Jon White now was actively dating the co-worker with whom he had
the affair, were at the base of the defense theory of the case supporting the request
to permit the defense of extreme emotional distress to the jury. R. 447-49. All of
these events were described as occurring within the last two to three years, some
even more recent in time, prior to the offenses in question. R. 711 at 76.
The district court denied the motion in limine. R. 648; R. 715. Both the
State and the trial court agree with the defense request to petition for interlocutory
review and indicated that appellate review and guidance would be of benefit and
should be sought. R. 715 at 11. The Utah Supreme Court transferred that petition
to this Court which granted the petition on the issue now presented. R. 697;
Addendum B. This appeal followed.

10

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court erroneously concluded the law and then misapplied that law
to the facts of this case as described in the factual section beginning on page 2
herein. This Court should find these facts to be more than sufficient evidence to
meet the corrected standard of presenting the case to the jury on the defense of
extreme emotional distress for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse.
While the State may take that same evidence and claim an intentional act to
commit murder, reasonable minds may differ whether the average reasonable
person under those same stressors and circumstances would have an extreme
emotional reaction to it and experience a loss of self-control such that the person's
reason would be overborne by the intense feelings discussed above. That
understanding is all that is required for this Court to reverse the trial court decision
and authorize introduction of the defense.
In Ms. White's case, no single violent event triggered her behavior. Rather
a loss of self control arguably occurred due to a lengthy repeated and escalating
pressure overborne by intense feelings such as passion, anger, distress, grief,
excessive agitation and similar emotions. These stressors very realistically were
extreme and overwhelming for someone in her shoes which were reasonably
brought about over time by the external forces of Jon White's behavior towards
her, coupled with the escalating financial pressures and extreme family and work
stressors, including the death of her doctor and counselor and the changes in her

11

medicine regime. Her circumstances meet the requirements of submitting the
affirmative defense to the jury.

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING MS. WHITE'S
MOTION IN LIMINE TO TO INTRODUCE THE AFFIRMATIVE
DEFENSE OF EXTREME EMOTIONAL DISTRESS TO THE JURY.
The trial court erroneously denied Ms. White's motion in limine to present
the defense of extreme emotional distress to the jury by making four distinct
conclusions of law. R. 651-52.; Addendum A, at 4-5. In short, the trial court
denied the motion by concluding as a matter of law that Ms. White did not present
sufficient evidence to justify an argument to the jury that she suffered from
extreme emotional distress when she allegedly committed the offenses in question.
Conclusion # 1; R. 651; Addendum A at 4. The trial court then omitted an
important subjective statutory perspective (the viewpoint of the reasonable person
under the then existing circumstances) when it concluded as a matter of law that
factors proffered by Ms. White would not cause the average reasonable person to
suffer from extreme emotional distress. Conclusion # 2; R. 651; Addendum A at
4-5.
The third conclusion of the trial court erroneously determined that Ms.
White's claimed defense of extreme emotional distress was inadequate as a matter
of law due to stressors being too remote in time and lacking a highly provocative
triggering event. Conclusion # 3; R. 652; Addendum A at 5. Finally, the fourth

12

conclusion of law replaced the trial judgment for that of a jury and concluded that
Ms. White did not lose self-control, had a plan and was aware of what she was
doing as evidenced by the complicated driving pattern of negotiating a chase and a
crash into the lobby of an office building in pursuit of her alleged victim.
Conclusion # 4; R. 652; Addendum A at 5.
Each conclusion of the trial court is erroneous and denies Ms. White her
right to a fair trial and present her defense as due process dictates.

A.

Ms. White enjoys the right to present her defense to the jury.

It has long been the law that a Defendant is entitled to have the jury
instructed on his theory of the crime if there is any basis in the evidence to support
that theory. State v. Brown, 607 P.2d 261, 265 (Utah 1980)(emphasis added).
Ms. White indicated an intent to rely on the defense of "extreme emotional distress
for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse," an affirmative defense. As
an affirmative defense, much like self defense, the defendant desiring to utilize
that defense must initially demonstrate a sufficient basis from which jurors may
entertain the defense in order for the question to be submitted to the jury. Our
Supreme Court has instructed on this basic due process principle:
If the defendant's evidence, although in material conflict with the State's
proof, be such that the jury may entertain a reasonable doubt as to whether
or not he acted in self-defense, he is entitled to have the jury instructed
fully and clearly on the law of self-defense. Conversely, if all reasonable
men must conclude that the evidence is so slight as to be incapable of
raising a reasonable doubt in the jury's mind as to whether a defendant
13

accused of a crime acted in self-defense, tendered instructions thereon are
properly refused.
Id. at 265-66 (quoting State v. Castillo, 457 P.2d 618, 620 (Utah I960)).
The Utah Court of Appeals reaffirmed this proposition in stating, "It is well
established that a "defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed on his theory
of the crime if there is any basis in the evidence to support that theory." State v.
Lopez. 789 P.2d 39, 44-45 (Utah App,1990Xquoting State v. Brown, 607 P.2d
261, 265 (Utah 1980)(emphasis in original)).
Ms. White insists there is ample basis in the evidence developed thus far,
and perhaps even additional evidence to be developed,3 to support her theory of
the affirmative defense that she suffered from extreme emotional distress for
which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse at the time of the criminal events
as alleged by the State in this matter.
Case law supports her position.

The Utah Supreme Court has discussed *

the affirmative defense of extreme emotional distress and rather decidedly
dispelled the errors contained in the trial court's analysis and conclusions of law.
In State v. Shumway, 2002 UT 124, 63 P.3d 94, the Court ruled:

. **

We conclude that defendant was entitled to an instruction under [extreme
emotional distress] because a jury could conclude that [Shumway] caused
the death of [the victim] "under the influence of extreme emotional distress
3

Ms. White refers to the fact that the trial court indicated its willingness to allow
the alleged victim to be deposed and the answers to the questions desired at the
preliminary hearing (and others) obtained from Jon White. R. 713 at 15. Such
questions would undoubtedly develop additional information in support of the type
and depth of stressors placed on Ms. White. Due to the current posture of the
case, such a deposition has yet to occur.
14

for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse." In holding that the
defendant was entitled to an instruction under [extreme emotional
distress], we do not suggest that [Shumway's] version of the events that
took place is the only reasonable interpretation of the evidence. Most
disturbing, of course, is the fact that the medical examiner testified that
Christopher had been stabbed thirty-nine times. However, in State v.
Standiford, 769 P.2d 254, 264, 266 (Utah 1988), we approved of the giving
of instructions for manslaughter and self-defense based on the defendant's
theory of the case where he had stabbed the victim 107 times. See also
State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d 750, 753-55 (Utah 1986), in which we held that
the defendant would be entitled to an instruction on extreme emotional
distress manslaughter where the victim had been stabbed twenty-seven
times and died of multiple critical wounds.
Shumway, 63 P.3d at 113.
Again, Shumway underscores the law that a defendant is entitled to present
her theory to the jury if there is any basis in the evidence to support that claim.
Here, in Ms. White's case, there is at least as much credibility (and Ms. White
asserts much more so) than in the claims of extreme emotional distress that had
been withheld from presentation in Shumway and the cases cited therein.

B. Ms. White's circumstances, a subjective view, were erroneously
omitted from the trial court's analysis.
The defense of extreme emotional distress is more completely defined in the
statute, in pertinent part, as follows:
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-403(4):
(4)(a) It is an affirmative defense to a charge of murder or attempted murder
that the defendant caused the death of another or attempted to cause the
death of another:
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(i) under the influence of extreme emotional distress for which there is a
reasonable explanation or excuse;
(c) The reasonableness of an explanation or excuse under Subsection
(4)(a)(i)... shall be determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable person
under the then existing circumstances.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(4)(emphasis added).
The trial court's conclusion misunderstands the statute as applied to Ms.
White. Its conclusion fatally omitted a critical subjective component to the
defense, to wit: the reasonableness of the explanation or excuse "shall be
determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable person under the then existing
circumstances." The trial court's conclusion does not take the analysis far
enough. Its second conclusion failed to employ the subjective component of the
statutory defense. See R. 651-52; Addendum A at 4-5.
The correct inquiry is not simply asking "would a reasonable person have
done what defendant did?" Rather, the reasonableness standard evaluates the
defendant's excuse or explanation for the behavior; the circumstances as they
existed for the defendant. The reasonableness requirement evaluates the
defendant's excuse, not her actions. The proper inquiry demands that "the
reasonableness of the explanation or excuse should be determined from the
viewpoint of the average, reasonable person under the then-existing
circumstances:' State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d439, 471 (Utah 1988)(emphasis
added). This determination "should be made by viewing the subjective, internal
situation in which the defendant found himself and the external circumstances as
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he perceived them at the time, however inaccurate that perception may have been,
and assessing from that standpoint whether the explanation or excuse for his
emotional disturbance was reasonable, so as to entitle him to a reduction of the
crime charged from murder in the second degree to manslaughter in the first
degree." People v. Casassa, 404 N.E.2d 1310. 1316 (N,Y. 1980).
The objective reasonableness requirement of the extreme emotional
distress defense does not ask the jury whether a reasonable person would behave
in such a way. Indeed, the state unsuccessfully made this flawed argument in
Shumway, arguing that "no reasonable person.. .teased by a good friend playing
with a knife during a sleepover, would have become so enraged or experience such
an extreme emotional disturbance as to cause him to kill that person by cutting his
throat and stabbing him thirty-nine times/' Shumway, 63 P.3d at ^f 12. As a New
York court explained, "[i]t should be stressed that the issue.. .is not whether the
defendant's act of killing his wife was a reasonable response under the
circumstances for, clearly, it was not. Rather, the issue is the reasonableness of the
explanation offered for the defendant's extreme emotional reaction." People v.
Liebman, 583 N.Y.S.2d234, 241 (N.Y.A.D. 1 Dept. 1992).
The Utah Supreme Court in Bishop listed three principal elements as
requisite to finding the application of extreme emotional disturbance:
[A] person suffers from an extreme mental or emotional disturbance:
(1) when he has no mental illness as defined in § 76-2-305 (insanity or
diminished capacity); and
(2) when he is exposed to extremely unusual and overwhelming stress; and
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(3) when the average reasonable person under that stress would have an
extreme emotional reaction to it, as a result of which he would experience
a loss of self-control and that person's reason would be overborne by
intense feelings, such as passion, anger, distress, grief, excessive agitation,
or other similar emotions.
Bishop, 753 P.2d at 471 (emphasis in original). All that is required to support the
claim for the defense is some external initiating circumstance accompanied by
extremely unusual and overwhelming stress and that a reasonable person under
that stress would have an extreme emotional reaction to it. Id.
Since Bishop the statute has been amended and extreme emotional
disturbance has been re-written to extreme emotional distress. Of course, a
reasonable explanation or excuse is still required, but the change in term to
"distress" is itself significant. A "disturbance" may be more easily definable as a
single event where "distress" more easily connotes a build-up over time. For
example, Blacks Law Dictionary defines "disturbance" as "an act" or "a wrong"
where "emotional distress" is defined as "a highly unpleasant mental reaction
(such as anguish, grief, fright, humiliation, or fury) that results from another
person's conduct; emotional pain and suffering. Blacks Law Dictionary, 8
edition, 511 & 563, respectively. The trial court did not address nor account for
this amended language in assessing the subjective perspective of Ms. White's
circumstances.
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C.
The trial court erred in requiring a contemporaneous highly
provocative triggering event.
Our Supreme Court, somewhat recently, has discussed in detail the
question of extreme emotional disturbance in two additionally helpful and
instructive ways. First, in Shumway, the Court, citing Bishop, stated:
Turning first to consideration under [extreme emotional disturbance], we
explained in State v. Bishop, 753 P2d 439, 471 (Utah 1988), overruled on
other grounds by State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393 (Utah 1994), that a
person suffers from an extreme emotional disturbance "when he is exposed
to extremely unusual and overwhelming stress" such that the average
reasonable person under that stress would have an extreme emotional
reaction to it, as a result of which he would experience a loss of selfcontrol and that person's reason would be overborne by intense feelings
such as passion, anger, distress, grief, excessive agitation, or other similar
emotions. Id. However, an extreme emotional disturbance will not serve
to reduce murder to manslaughter if the actor brought about his own
mental disturbance. Gardner, 789 P.2d 282-83; § 76-5-203(3)(b)(ii).
State v. Shumway, 63 P.3d 94, ^ 9 (Utah 2002)(citations in original)(emphasis
added). The facts in Shumway inarguably provide the necessary clarification and
direction that "distress" as contrasted with "disturbance" need not and perhaps
rarely is an isolated event. Moreover, the initiating circumstance (heretofore
called a "trigger") was not as highly provocative and violent an initiating event as
described by the State.
In Shumway the Court described that initiating circumstances as follows:
One interpretation of the evidence supports the necessity for a
manslaughter instruction under subsection (3)(a)(i). Brookes [the
defendant] disclosed to police that on the morning of the altercation
Christopher was irritated at him for beating Christopher at video games. As
the boys went to bed, Christopher went to the kitchen and retrieved a knife
that he began to throw in the air and catch. Christopher then lunged at
Brookes and began poking him with the knife. The boys wrestled over
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control of the knife and in his anger, Brookes stabbed Christopher.
Brookes also suffered stab wounds to his hand. There was evidence that
Christopher had a reputation for being a "hothead" and losing his temper,
while Brookes was known to be cooperative and peaceful. Other evidence
supported the argument that Brookes had been bullied and pushed around
by his peers since he was in the third grade, and that all of this "came out
on Chris" when the boys fought over the knife.
Id. at T| 10. The facts revealed that Shumway was 15 years old at the time of the
murder; third graders are 8 or 9 years of age so this particular and determined to
be a relevant distress factor relied on by the Court in Shumway was over 6 or
seven years old. Similarly the Court spoke of reputation evidence which by
practical definition cannot be created from a single event but must necessarily be
ascertained over time.
The Utah Supreme Court recognized that circumstances which may have
occurred years prior to the offense could certainly contribute to the defendant's
mental state at the time of the offense, and likewise could be considered by a jury
in determining whether the defendant acted under the influence of "extreme
emotional distress for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse." The
Court reversed the murder conviction In Shumway because the jury was not
instructed appropriately and was not allowed to determine the reasonableness of
the defendant's acts under those stressors.
The Utah Supreme Court also recently reviewed and upheld the Court of
Appeals decision in State v. Spillers, 2005 UT App. 283, 116 P.3d 985, affd 152
P.3d 315 (Utah 2007). There the State had appealed the Court of Appeal's
decision claiming that court erred in reversing the conviction because of the trial
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court's failure to give an extreme emotional distress instruction. The State
claimed, as the State does here, that Spillers did not merit the instruction.
[T]he State's assertion rests on its own conclusion that Defendant acted
"rationally" throughout the encounter; however, the question of whether
Defendant acted "rationally" is a question of fact properly belonging to the
jury. While a jury could adopt the State's version of events and convict
Defendant of murder, a jury could also believe Defendant's interpretation
of the evidence and conclude that he was not acting rationally, but rather
was under extreme emotional distress as a result of Jackson's attack and
convict on the lesser offense of manslaughter.
Second, the State contends that Defendant did not present evidence that he
was in fact experiencing "extreme emotional distress." Rather, the State
maintains that Defendant merely testified that he felt nervous and that the
blow to his head left him feeling cloudy, dazed, uncomfortable, and scaredterms not indicative, in the State's view, of extreme emotional distress.
State v. Spillers nil. 2007 UT 13, 152 P.3d 315, K1f 18-19. The trial court's
conclusions, similar to the State's position in Spillers IL rests on the conclusion
that defendant acted rationally. As the Court stated there, whether she acted
rationally here is a question of fact properly presented to the jury.
In contrast, and demonstrating the trial court's error here, the Supreme
Court in Spillers II characterized those facts as follows:
Like Shumway this case could be interpreted to support Defendant's
contention that he experienced extreme emotional distress and was
therefore entitled to a manslaughter instruction. Defendant testified that he
and Jackson were arguing prior to the altercation and that Jackson was
upset with him, accusing him of snitching to drug enforcement officers.
The tone of the conversation made Defendant nervous. Defendant stated
that Jackson retrieved a firearm and struck Defendant on the back of the
head. Defendant testified that the blow left him cloudy, dazed,
uncomfortable, and scared. According to the nurse's testimony, the blow
may have resulted in a two-inch hematoma that was present on Defendant's
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head the day after the shooting. Defendant testified that after being struck,
he turned to face Jackson, who was cocking his arm back to strike
Defendant again. At that point, Defendant shot Jackson three times,
although at trial he testified that he remembered firing only a single shot.
Further, witnesses testified that Jackson had a reputation for violence.
Thus, a rational jury could, adopting Defendant's version of events, find
that he was experiencing extreme emotional distress for which there was a
reasonable explanation or excuse when he shot Jackson.
Id. at ^| 16. This case, like Shumway, relies on the initiating incident only as the
starting point for the analysis allowing the jury to determine the reasonableness, if
any, to the claimed affirmative defense. Again, a reputation is acquired over time,
permitting something less than a single highly provocative triggering event to
justify granting the defense. The trial court's opinion to the contrary is erroneous.
R. 652; Addendum A at 5.

D. Cumulative effects from stressors permissibly justify the defense of
extreme emotional distress.
In a recognized landmark case addressing extreme emotional distress, a
New York court illuminated the long history leading to the recognition of the
cumulative effect of events in these cases:
An action influenced by an extreme emotional disturbance is not one that is
necessarily so spontaneously undertaken. Rather, it may be that a
significant mental trauma has affected a defendant's mind for a substantial
period of time, simmering in the unknowing subconscious and then
inexplicably coming to the fore. The differences between the present New
York statute and its predecessor and its ancient Maine analogue can be
explained by the tremendous advances made in psychology since 1881 and
a willingness on the part of the courts, legislators, and the public to reduce
the level of responsibility imposed on those whose capacity has been
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diminished by mental trauma. It is consistent with modern criminological
thought to reduce the defendant's criminal liability upon proof of mitigating
circumstances which render his conduct less blameworthy.
People v. Patterson, 347 N.E.2d 898, 908 (N.Y. 1976).
Another court listed several examples of cases where extreme emotional
distress was determined to be a result of cumulative effects:
[I]n every case we have read there has been some connection between the
victim and the slayer precipitating or aggravating an emotional response in
the defendant. See, e.g., Elliott, supra (defendant, who shot his brother, was
acting under an extreme emotional disturbance caused by combination of
child-custody problems, the inability to maintain a recently purchased
home, and an overwhelming fear of his brother); Ratliff v. Comonwealth.
567 S.W.2d 307 (Ky.1978) (defendant believed victim was a conspirator
against her); People v. Cassasa, 49 N.Y.2d 668, 427 N.Y.S.2d 769, 404
N.E.2d 1310 (1980), cert, denied 449 U.S. 842, 101 S.Ct. 122, 66 L.Ed.2d
50 (1980) (victim rejected defendant as a suitor)
State v. Trieb, 315 N.W.2d 649, 659 (N.D. 1982).
The Elliott matter, noted above, is particularly instructive as therein the
court stated the following as very similar evidence to Ms. White's case was
introduced about the claimed defense that had been denied the defendant.
The defendant offered into evidence the testimony of a psychiatrist
who interviewed the defendant about eleven months after the shooting. The
psychiatrist testified that the defendant, at the time of the shooting, was
acting under the influence of an extreme emotional disturbance caused by
a combination of child custody problems, the inability to maintain a
recently purchased home and an overwhelming fear of his brother. The
psychiatrist placed particular emphasis on the history of conflict between
the two brothers, noting that the defendant referred to his brother as a
"ranger killer." The defendant told the psychiatrist that at one time his
brother pulled him from a bus and chased him with a tire iron. The
defendant stated that this incident was so frightening that it caused him to
leave the area for a couple of years. The psychiatrist believed that this
incident compounded by many other extenuating circumstances resulted in
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the defendant's overwhelming fear of his brother. And he testified that
these circumstances taken together constituted a reasonable explanation of
the defendant's extreme emotional disturbance.
State v.EUiott. 177 Conn. 1, 2, 411 A.2d 3, 8 (1979)(emphasis added). The court
there found that the jury should have been instructed on the correct subjective
perspective and reversed the convicting remanding for a new trial. Id. at 10.

E. Additional Considerations support that Ms. White is entitled to the
defense.
Several other helpful points were articulated by the Utah Supreme Court in
Spillers II which further demonstrates the error committed by the trial court in this
matter. First, the Court instructs that the extreme emotional distress request for
instruction is to be considered the same as an instruction on a lesser included
offense and that the instruction "must be given if (i) the statutory elements of
greater and lesser included offenses overlap ... and (ii) the evidence provides a
rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and
convicting him of the included offense." Spillers II, 152 P.3d_at ^f 12.
Second, very importantly, the Court reminds that when considering a
defense requests for the jury instruction, the court necessarily "view[s] the
evidence and the inferences that can be drawn from it in the light most favorable
to the defense." Id. at 1f 10 (quoting State v. Crick, 675 P.2d 527, 539 (Utah
1983). Finally, the Court clarifies, correcting the State's position, that
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a defendant in a criminal case bears no burden of persuasion. "The ultimate
burden of proving the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt remains
on the state, whether defendant offers any evidence in an effort to prove
affirmative defenses or not." ... Accordingly, a defendant is not required
to use particular language or key words in his testimony to identify his
mental state as extreme emotional distress before a jury may consider that
defense in a criminal trial. As long as the evidence presented at trial
supports a defendant's theory of the crime and provides a rational basis for
a verdict on the lesser included offense, a defendant is entitled to the jury
instruction if he requests it.
Id. at f 19 (citations omitted).
Accordingly, as Ms. White has urged, our courts have recognized that there
are factors or events that may have occurred long before the offense which are
relevant and therefore appropriately must be considered by a jury in determining
whether an accused has acted under the influence of "extreme emotional distress
for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse." The initiating event need
not be a violent or tumultuous event. All that is required is that there be "some
external initiating circumstance" bringing out the distress accompanied by
extremely unusual and overwhelming stress such that a reasonable person under
that stress as viewed under the then existing circumstances would have an extreme
emotional reaction to it. This determination in this case is a question for the jury
to decide.
CONCLUSION
The trial court erroneously concluded the law and then misapplied that l^w
to the facts of this case as described in the factual section beginning on page 1,
supra. This Court should find these facts to be more than sufficient evidence tc
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meet the corrected standard of presenting the case to the jury on the defense of
extreme emotional distress for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse.
While the State may take that same evidence and claim an intentional act to
commit murder, reasonable minds may differ whether the average reasonable
person under those same stressors and circumstances would have an extreme
emotional reaction to it and experience a loss of self-control such that the person's
reason would be overborne by the intense feelings discussed above. That
understanding is all that is required for this Court to reverse the trial court decision
and authorize introduction of the defense.
In Ms. White's case, no single violent event triggered her behavior. Rather
a loss of self control arguably occurred due to a lengthy repeated and escalating
pressure overborne by intense feelings such as passion, anger, distress, grief,
excessive agitation and similar emotions. These stressors very realistically were
extreme and overwhelming for someone in her shoes which were reasonably
brought about over time by the external forces of Jon White's behavior towards
her, coupled with the escalating financial pressures and extreme family and work
stressors, including the death of her doctor and counselor and the changes in her
medicine regime. Her circumstances meet the requirements of submitting the
affirmative defense to the jury.
Accordingly, for all or any of the foregoing reasons, Ms. White
respectfully requests that this Court grant her appeal, reverse the decision of the
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trial court and permit her to introduce all relevant facts and present the affirmative
defense of extreme emotional distress at her jury trial in this matter.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this <£_ day of^priL 2008.

A. S C H A T Z r # W ^
Attorney for Ms. White

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
,#

I hereby certify that on the^T day of April, 2008,1 have caused one
original and seven true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF
APPELLANT to be filed with the Clerk of the Utah Court of Appeals and two
additional copies to be either hand delivered or mailed first class to the following:
The Office of the Attorney General
Attn: Kris C. Leonard, Esq.
Attorney for Appellee
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
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I delivered the number of copies to the Utah Court of Appeals and the Assistantl
Attorney General Kris C. Leonard as indicated above this
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
-vs-

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER
Regarding Defendant's
Motion in Limine re Extreme
Emotional Distress

BRENDA CHRISTINE WHITE
Case No. 061902834
Defendant.
Hon. WILLIAM W. BARRETT

This matter came before the Court on October 19 , 2007, for a hearing regarding
the Defendant's Motion in Limine concerning the defense of Extreme Emotional
Distress. The Defendant was present and represented by counsel, Jason Schatz. The State
was represented by Alicia H. Cook and Stephen L. Nelson. The Court has received and
reviewed Defendant's Motion in Limine re Extreme Emotional Distress and supporting
memorandum, and the State's Reply. The Court heard oral argument from both parties
concerning the motion on October 19 , 2007.
Having fully considered the memoranda and arguments of counsel, and for good
cause shown, the Court now makes and enters the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT

1.

The victim in this case, Jon White, was married to Defendant White for eleven
years before he left the marital home in November of 2005 and initiated divorce
proceedings.

2.

Mr. White worked for the Principal Financial Group in the Woodland Towers
building, located at 4021 South 700 East, which is where he was employed on the
day of the incident, April 26 ,2006. On that date, Defendant White went to Mr.
White's place of work during the lunch hour and asked Mr. White to sign a quitclaim deed to the marital home. Mr. White refused to sign and returned to work.

3.

At approximately 4:30 p.m., Mr. White left the Woodland Towers building and was
walking toward his car in a covered parking area when he heard the sound of
squealing tires. Mr. White saw Defendant White speeding toward him in her Ford
Explorer, and jumped between two parked cars. Mr. White jumped over a threefoot cement wall at the end of the covered parking structure, and ran through a
visitor parking lot back toward the Woodland Towers building. As Mr. White
approached the east entrance of the building, he turned and saw Defendant White >
speeding through the visitor parking lot after him. Defendant White drove up onto
the sidewalk leading from the parking lot to the building, and turned the Explorer
toward the building. Mr. White ran through the first set of doors at the east
entrance, and Defendant White drove the Explorer through the glass doors.
Defendant White struck Mr. White with the Explorer and threw him back
approximately ten feet. Mr. White picked himself up off the ground and ran down a
corridor to the west lobby on the opposite side of the building. Defendant White
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chased Mr. White down the hallway and hit him with her vehicle a second time in
the west lobby. Mr. White flew over the hood of the Explorer and landed on the
ground. Mr. White stood to run away, but was unable to put any pressure on his left
leg. Mr. White hobbled down a smaller hallway until he found a service closet, arid
hid there until he was discovered by a maintenance worker. Defendant White,
meanwhile, drove her vehicle entirely through the glass windows of the west lobby,
then reversed her vehicle back into the building and across the lobby. Defendant
White pulled forward again and stopped her vehicle in the middle of the lobby. The
incident was first reported to the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office at 4:39 p.m..
4.

In the defendant's motion in limine, Defendant White proffered the evidence that
she argued constituted a basis for extreme emotional distress. In summary, the
defendant proffered that Jon White forced Defendant White to engage in a
"threesome" with a co-worker, that Jon White viewed pornography and was
investigated for possession of child pornography, and that Defendant White
discovered that Mr. White was engaged in an extra-marital affair prior to their
separation. Defendant White also proffered that she was financially stressed aftei
the separation, that Jon White only spent the minimum visitation time with their
children, that Mr. White made the visitation schedule difficult, that Mr. White
denied owning a cell phone, and that Mr. White promised to assist her with
refinancing the marital home, but refused to cooperate in the refinance process.
Defendant White was also being supplied with medications by a nurse practitioner
named Valerie Talbot who died on March 20th, 2006, due to the fact that Mr. White
had cancelled the defendant from his insurance policy. The Court does not make

3

u>eo

any findings of fact concerning the proffered evidence because the Court does not
weigh the credibility of the evidence for purposes of this motion. (State v. Kruger.
6P.3d 1116, 1119 (Ut. S.Ct. 2000).

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The defense of extreme emotional distress is not applicable to Defendant White's
case. The circumstances proffered by Defendant White do not constitute extreme
emotional distress, therefore there is no rational basis in the evidence for the
defendant's theory that she committed Attempted Manslaughter rather than
Attempted Homicide. Accordingly, the defendant has not presented a sufficient
quantum of evidence to warrant jury instructions on the defense of extreme
emotional distress and the lesser included offense of Attempted Manslaughter.
The factors proffered by Defendant White do not meet the definition of "extremely
unusual and overwhelming stress" given in State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 471 (Ut.
S.Ct. 1988). The extreme emotional distress defense is available only to defendants
who have been subjected to stress that would cause the average reasonable person
to have an extreme emotional reaction and experience a loss of self-control.
Bishop, 753 P.2d at 471. Defendant White cites marital difficulties, financial stress,
difficulties with the divorce, and the death of Ms. Talbot as stressors that
accumulated over time to create a situation wherein she lost self-control on the day
of the incident. The Court, however, is required to evaluate how these stressors
would impact the average reasonable person, and whether these stressors would
cause a reasonable person to experience a loss of self-control. The stressors cited
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by Defendant White do not rise to this level; they are common occurrences that are
endured by many people, and in this case do not justify the attempted homicide of
Jon White.
The reasonableness of these stressors as an adequate excuse or explanation for a
loss of self-control is further diminished by the length of time between the stressors
and the incident. Several of the stressors that Defendant White proffers (the
threesome, the pornography investigation, and the death of Ms. Talbot) occurred
th

several weeks to years before April 26 , 2006. Furthermore, the Court has
reviewed the two most recent decisions of the Utah appellate courts dealing with
extreme emotional distress, and has noted that in both cases a highly provocative
event occurred immediately before the crime. (State v. Shumway, 3 P.3d 94; State
v. Spillers, 152 P.2d 315 (Ut S.Ct. 2007). In the case at bar, there is a complete
absence of a similarly provocative event on or near the day in question.
The circumstances of the crime itself indicate that Defendant White had not lost
self-control at the time of the incident, but appeared to be acting in accordance with
a plan. The disagreement about the quit-claim deed occurred during the noon hoiir,
and the crime occurred more than four hours later at approximately 4:30, when Mr.
White was walking across the parking lot toward his vehicle. The complicated
driving pattern that Defendant White negotiated to pursue Mr. White also indicates
that Defendant White was aware of what she was doing and was in control of her
faculties during the time in question.
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ORDER

Defendant White's Motion in Limine regarding Extreme Emotional Distress is
denied. The information that Defendant White has proffered does not constitute evidence
of extreme emotional distress, and therefore is irrelevant to that defense and may not be
presented as evidence of extreme emotional distress.

Mi 2007.
Dated this JU_ day of Nto#rib€r,

By the Court:

WILLIAM W. BA"
Third District Court'S^ud^SoS^t^

Approved as to form:

Jason Schatz
Counsel for Defendant
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FILED
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
00O00

State of Utah,

ORDER
Case No. 20071008-CA

Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Brenda Christine White,
Defendant and Petitioner.

Before Judges Greenwood, Davis, and McHugh.
This matter is before the court on a petition for permission
to appeal from an interlocutory order filed pursuant to Rule 5 of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition for permission to
appeal is GRANTED on only the following issue:
Whether the trial court erred in denying Defendant's motion in
limine to introduce the affirmative defense of extreme emotional
distress.
DATED this 3 /

day of January, 2 008,

FOR THE COURT:

^amfi] aT.
T. Greenwood,
Greenwood,
Pamela
Presiding Judge
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